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Public Entities, Officers, and Employees
As a Matter of Fact, I Do Own the Whole Damned Road:
Municipal Impediments to Advanced Telecommunications
Services Through Control of the Public Right of Way
David E. Haddock
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in computer science and telecommunications technologies are bringing
dramatic changes to the way Americans live and work. Television is evolving to the
point where, soon, subscribers will receive only one channel, where each program
is chosen and scheduled by the viewer.' Interpersonal communication has changed
to the point where many Americans are more likely to send electronic rather than
paper mail.2 Perhaps the workplace is being affected more dramatically: High-speed
data communication allows many workers to connect to the office network and work
from home, as if there was no distance between home and office
These and other emerging technologies depend upon the existence of an
expensive web of cable and wire that connects homes and businesses to vast com-
munications networks, such as those used for long-distance telephone service.4These
complicated networks allow e-mail to be sent from one computer to another.5 They
make it possible for people to work from a home in the suburbs with the same speed
and efficiency as if they were at the office, in the city6
1. See William J. Cook, This Is Not Your Father's Television, U.S. NEwS & WORLD REP., Dec. 6,1993,
at 63 (reporting that "interactive video" will allow a consumer "to watch any program anytime-even if he's the
only person who chooses to watch"); id. (explaining that, "since subscribers only watch one thing at a time, only
one channel.., would be required-but it would have, in effect, unlimited capacity").
2. See Grant Parsons, Army Online 'Mail Call!' Today Might Mean E-Mail from a Loved One at Home,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 20, 1995, at El (reciting the views of several soldiers who prefer e-mail
to postal mail because it is "easier," "much more fun," and "quicker").
3. See Internet Access: Pacific Bell and Cisco Team to Develop Systems for Internet and Remote-Office
Communications, EDGE, ON & ABouT AT&T, Aug. 19, 1996, at *1, available in 1996 WL 8072105 [hereinafter
Internet Access] (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (explaining that, with one communications technology
known as ISDN "and with easy computer connectivity, the telecommuter will be able to work with full efficiency");
Mike Murray, Telecommuting: An Alternative to the Freeways, L.A. Bus. J., Feb. 7, 1994, at 26 (revealing that, by
using computers and communications equipment, "virtually all office tasks can be completed at home").
4. See Patricia D. Dennis & Gary M. Epstein, Panel Discussion: The Future of Telecommunications, in
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK 139,197 (1987) (explaining
that telecommunications transmissions, which include voice, video, and data, use networks composed of copper
wire and fiber-optic cable, along with wireless networks); id. (claiming that voice conversations and data
transmissions normally use telephone wires).
5. See Parsons, supra note 2, at El (noting that e-mail is sent over telephone lines).
6. See Internet Access, supra note 3, at * I (explaining that communications technologies will allow users
to "send digital information over phone lines at very fast rates").
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Unfortunately, broadband data networks are expensive to create? Typically,
companies that wish to offer advanced services must dig trenches and lay thousands
of miles of cable in city streets! Since cutting city streets is likely to interrupt traffic
patterns and create temporary road hazards, cities generally require companies to
obtain local permits before they dig
As deregulation allows the telecommunications industry to become competitive,
and the number of companies desiring to dig up city streets increases, the relationship
between municipalities and telecommunications firms is becoming tense.'0 Some
municipalities, believing they have a fiduciary duty to collect rent for this use of the
public light of way, have been willing to delay or deny construction permits to those
telecommunications firms that are unwilling to pay franchise fees to the city." This
practice has caused expensive construction delays in some of California's biggest
markets.1 2 Maintaining that a state franchise protects them from being charged for the
7. See Pennsylvania Info Superhighway Cost Less than $2 Billion, INTERACrrVE FACrs, July 4, 1994, at
*1, available in 1994 WL 3169861 (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (reporting predictions that Pen-
nsylvania's information superhighway can be built for less than $2 billion, much less than the original estimate of
$11 billion to $15 billion); Time Warner's Levin Sees No Change in Turner Plans, MEDIA DAILY, Nov. 21, 1995,
at *1, available in 1995 WL 10083976 (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (characterizing new digital
telecommunications networks as "hugely expensive").
8. See Patricia Horn, Phone Hangups: Cities Find Themselves Blindsided by Effects of Deregulation, SUN-
SENTrNEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 13, 1996, at IG (noting that "[c]able and phone companies need permits to
dig up streets and sidewalks to lay cable!); Eric Krapf, The Upstream Path to HFC: Getting the 'Dirt' Out,
AMERICA'S NETWORK, May 1, 1996, at *2, available in 1996 WL 8985169 (copy on file with the Pacific Law
Journal) (claiming that there is "more than 1 million miles of cable plant installed in the U.S.').
9. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 39732 (West 1988) (granting local legislative bodies the power to issue permits
for the construction and maintenance of telegraph and telephone lines); CAL STs. & HtGH. CODE § 1460 (West
1990) (authorizing the road commissioner to issue permits for excavating county highways); Horn, supra note 8,
at IG (noting the requirement that telecommunications companies get permits before digging up streets to lay
cable).
10. See CAL. PUB. UTIL CODE § 709.5 (West Supp. 1996) (declaring the legislative intent that all telecom-
munications markets be opened to competition by January 1, 1997); Jonathan Volzke, Where the Streets Bear No
Blame, OP.ANGE COUNTY REm., May 17, 1996, at B I (noting that 40 telecommunications companies are approved
to work in the state of California). See generally MICHAEL K. KELLOGO ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LAW §§ 14.1-.10 (1992) (recounting the history of regulatory prohibitions of competition between telephone
companies and cable television operators).
11. Letter from DeAnn Baker, Legislative Representative, California State Association of Countie, and
David A. Jones, Legislative Representative, League of California Cities, to Senator Jim Costa (iar. 6, 1996)
[hereinafter Letter from Baker & Jones] (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal); see id. (claiming that cities
and counties, as property managers of public assets, have a fiduciary duty to charge rent for the use of those assets);
see also Amy Harmon, PacBell Pulls Plug on Vaunted High.Tech Plan, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1996, at 1 (reporting
that Los Angeles officials admitted that, along with aesthetic concerns, negotiations over franchise fees inspired
the city's refusal to issue more than 100 construction permits necessary for Pacific Bell's project to install an
interactive television system); Jeff Pelline, L.A. Roadblock Stops PacTel Television Project, S.F. CHtRON., Jan. 16,
1996, at Cl [hereinafter Pelline, LA. Roadblock] (reporting that Pacific Telesis stopped construction in Los Angeles
because of permitting difficulties).
12. See Harmon, supra note 11, at I (noting that permitting difficulties with the city of Los Angeles led to
lost jobs for 450 workers); Pelline, LA. Roadblock, supra note 11, at Cl (noting similar regulatory resistance from
other municipalities including Los Angeles, San Jose, and Milpitas); Jeff Pelline, Pacific Bell at Juncture In San
Jose, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 18, 1996, at B I [hereinafter Pelline, Pacific Bell at Juncture] (explaining that permitting
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use of city streets, at least one telecommunications provider elected to cease con-
struction rather than face continued municipal delays and uncertain costs.
t3
Local officials in other cities worry about the impact that this deluge of digging
will have upon the lifespan of city roads.t 4 Citing evidence that multiple street cuts,
even when properly repaired, diminish the lifespan of roads, some local officials
have proposed exacting impact fees from those firms that cut city streets.' 5 The pro-
ceeds from these fees would be used to offset the cost of resurfacing streets whose
useful life is prematurely exhausted due to street cuts. 6 Utilities, such as tele-
communications providers, that depend upon street cuts, dispute claims that multiple
cuts diminish the lifespan of roads and view these fees merely as attempts to raise
revenue for municipal budgets. 7
Unfortunately, as telecommunications providers turn to wireless solutions rather
than pursue expensive negotiations with local governments over the use of city
streets, California consumers are prevented from using many of the advanced
services that can only be provided by cabled networks. 8 In order for California to
achieve its goal of having a "state-of-the-art communications infrastructure" that is
able to "position California businesses as strong competitors in national and inter-
national markets" and "improve the quality of life through telecommuting and im-
proved access to information," these disputes over the use of city streets must be
resolved.' 9
What will be the relationship between municipalities and telecommunications
providers in the information age? How much control should local governments have
over the deployment of advanced telecommunications services in their communities?
The legislature's effort to address these concerns is embodied in Chapter 300.
difficulties inspired Pacific Bell to stop construction and turn to wireless technologies).
13. Pelline, L.A. Roadblock, supra note 11, at Cl; see id. (reporting that Pacific Telesis postponed con-
struction in Los Angeles due to permitting difficulties); see also PACIFIC TELESIS, SENATE BILL NO. 1896 (May 6,
1996) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (urging support of Chapter 300 and declaring Pacific Bell's
position that California Public Utilities Code § 7901 grants them a statewide franchise to place their facilities
without the burden of municipal fees).
14. Volzke, supra note 10, at BI; see id. (expressing municipal fears that street cuts reduce the useful life
of streets).
15. Id.; see id. (noting that a number of studies show that street cuts can reduce the life of a street from 20
years to 15 years); see also id. (indicating that several cities have proposed charging companies that cut streets an
impact fee, the amount of which would depend upon the length of the cut and the age of the street).
16. See Dan Boyle, City Seeks to Reduce Subsidies, L.A. DAILY NEws, Apr. 29, 1990, at I (observing that
Santa Clarita's proposed street impact fees would reduce subsidies for street repaving by $2.6 million).
17. Alan Eyerly, Both Sides Air Views on Street Trench Fees, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1996, at B2; see i.
(outlining utility's argument that increased traffic, and not street cuts, reduces the life of roads); Volzke, supra note
10, at B1 (reporting Pacific Bell's position that any sort of street impact fee is a tax).
18. See Pelline, Pacific Bell at Juncture, supra note 12 at BI (noting that some telecommunications
companies are turning to wireless solutions); see also Harmon, supra note 11, at Cl (quoting Los Angeles County
resident Daniel Stay, who explained that his neighbors were disappointed that Pacific Bell had decided not to install
a planned interactive television system). See generally infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (discussing the
inherent advantages of cabled networks over wireless networks).
19. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1274, sec. 1, at 6021 (enacting CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 709).
949
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Part II of this Legislative Note considers the legal framework that existed before
Chapter 300 was enacted. Part I discusses Chapter 300 and its effect upon current
disputes between municipalities and telecommunications providers. Finally, Part IV
examines the ramifications of Chapter 300's failure to address the conflict over
telecommunications franchise fees.
II. THE LAW BEFORE CHAPTER 300
Although telephone service offers the immeasurable benefit of instant, real-time,
voice conversation, the utility of telephone service depends upon connectivity.
Having a telephone line is not very useful if those people you are likely to call are not
also connected to the telephone system. In 1905, the California State Legislature
encouraged connectivity by enacting a statute, now codified at California Public
Utilities Code § 7901, that offered to telephone companies a state franchise to install
and maintain telephone wires upon or along state roads and waterways. 21 The
California Supreme Court explained that the acceptance 22 of this offer creates vested
rights that cannot be impaired by subsequent acts of the legislature, or even by con-
stitutional provision.23 Section 7901 encourages interconnectivity by providing
telephone companies assurances that they can invest the considerable funds necessary
to lay telephone cable between municipalities without fear that a local government
will assess potentially crippling charges for access to local roads.
24
Since California Public Utilities Code § 7901 is an offer of a state franchise, tele-
phone companies do not need to obtain franchises from local authorities.25 As the
California Supreme Court explained in 1959, "[tlhe geographical area of [a tele-
phone] exchange is based upon a community of business and social interests of
people residing in that area, and thus its boundaries do not necessarily conform to the
boundaries of cities."26 By giving the power to regulate the telephone industry to a
state agency, the Public Utilities Commission, the legislature assured that munici-
palities would not be able to put other interests, such as an interest in generating
revenue, ahead of, for example, the Sacramento business community's interest in
20. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting that telephone transmissions use networks of copper
wire).
21. 1905 Cal. Stat. ch. 385, sec. 1, at 491-92 (enacting CAL CrV. CODE § 536, now codified at CAL. PUB.
UTi. CODE § 7901).
22. See Los Angeles County v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d 378,384, 196 P.2d 773,777-78 (1948)
(explaining that the offer of the franchise is accepted by construction and maintenance of telephone lines).
23. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d at 384, 196 P.2d at 778 (explaining that these vested rights cannot
be impaired by subsequent acts of the legislature); Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Railroad Comm'n., 200 Cal. 463, 472,
254 P. 258, 261 (1927) (declaring that these vested rights cannot be impaired even by the people through a
constitutional provision).
24. See 59 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 376,378 (1976) (explaining that, because of California Public Utilities Code
§ 7901, cities have no power to charge telephone companies for the use of city streets).
25. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of S.F., 51 Cal. 2d 766,771,336 P.2d 514, 517 (1959).
26. Id. at 772,336 P.2d at 518.
950
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being able to communicate with the residents of West Sacramento. 7 Although §
7901 did not solve all of the telephone industry's connectivity problems-for
example, it did not require a telephone company to interconnect with its competitors
-by preempting the municipal power to grant telephone franchises, the state legis-
lature assured that telephone services would be deployed in the interests of the people
of the entire state and would not be held up by the potentially conflicting views of
various local governments s
Due to the franchise granted by § 7901, telephone companies may install and
maintain telephone cables without compensating the municipality for the use of the
public right-of-way, and without being subject to the municipal power to award
franchises.2 However, this exemption only applies when telephone companies install
cables for predominant use as telephone linesYa If a telephone company installs
cables in the public right of way for use in providing cable television, it is subject to
municipal franchising authority?'
In contrast to telephone companies, cable television firms are regulated chiefly
by local governments, and are subject to municipal power to grant franchises and
assess franchise fees. 2 Companies that wish to enter the cable television market in
a particular city must typically bid for the privilege at public auctions, where the firm
27. See CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (West 1975) (giving to the Public Utilities Commission the power to
supervise and regulate every public utility in the state); see also id. § 216(a) (West Supp. 1997) (defining "public
utility" to include a telephone corporation whenever the telephone corporation delivers service to the public).
28. See Pacific TeL & TeL Co., 51 Cal. 2d at 771-76,336 P.2d at 517-20 (explaining that telephone service
is a matter of statewide concern, and not a municipal affair, because the people of California have an important
interest in communicating with each other); Southern CaL TeL Co.. 32 Cal. 2d at 384, 196 P.2d at 777 (suggesting
that California Civil Code § 536, now codified as California Public Utilities Code § 7901, protects the interests of
the entire state because the acceptance of the franchise requires the telephone company's commitment to furnish
adequate communication services).
29. See 59 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 376, 378 (1976) (observing that, because of § 7901, cities have no power
to charge telephone companies for the use of city streets); 22 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 1, 3 (1953) (asserting that, due
to § 7901, telephone companies need not obtain local franchises or pay for the use of city streets); see also supra
note 25 and accompanying text (explaining that § 7901 is an offer of a state franchise that frees telephone
companies from municipal franchising burdens).
30. See Television Transmission, Inc. v. P.U.C., 47 Cal. 2d 82, 87,301 P.2d 862,865 (1956) (determining
that a telephone company can only benefit from the protections of § 7901 when its lines are used "in connection
with or to facilitate communication by telephone"); see also 46 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 22, 22 (1965) (declaring that
"[t]he statewide franchise of Public Utilities Code section 7901 is not applicable to a telephone corporation when
it is not constructing a telephone or telegraph line").
31. See 46 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 22,22 (1965) (concluding that, when a telephone company installs cables
for use in a television system, cities can require a franchise or license under California Government Code § 53066).
32. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 53066(a), (c) (West Supp. 1997); see idL (granting to cities and counties the power
to award franchises for the construction of cable television systems, and authorizing cities and counties to collect
franchise fees in amounts equal to as much as five percent of gross revenues); see also California Community
Television Ass'n v. General Tel. Co., 73 Cal. P.U.C. 507,515 (1972) (determining that cable television companies
are not "telephone corporations" and, except regarding safety standards, they are not subject to the regulatory power
of the Public Utilities Commission).
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that is willing to pay the most, and offer the most services, is the likely victor . 3 The
price of victory usually involves surrendering to the city programming control over
certain "public access" cable channels, and wiring city buildings and schools without
reimbursement.' 4 In addition to the burdens of this franchising process, California
law and federal law both allow cities to charge cable television firms a franchise fee
of up to five percent of gross revenues as rent for the use of the public right of way.35
Thus, while telephone companies pay nothing for the opportunity to lay their wires
along California roads, cable television firms are required to pay municipalities up
to five percent of gross revenues for the same privilege. 6
Although § 7901 gives telephone companies the right to install cables in
California roads, they, along with cable operators, are still subject to the municipal
power to regulate the time, place, and manner in which the franchise is exercised.37
This type of regulation can include requirements that telephone companies obtain
local construction permits, pay the cost of inspecting construction sites, and pay for
restoring streets damaged by their own street cuts.38
Although the police power gives municipalities the authority to charge these
kinds of fees, existing state law places limitations upon the amount that can be
charged and the way it can be spent. For example, before a local government may
impose a fee as a condition of approval of a development project, such as a project
to install telephone wire in the streets of a city, the local government must show that
there is a reasonable relationship between the amount of the fee and the cost of
providing the facility for which the fee is charged.39 Thus, fees must be charged for
33. See Jay L. Kanzler, Getting the Clear Picture on Cable Franchise Monopolies, 47 J. Mo. B. 53,63 n.62
(1991) (noting that in Los Angeles, the cable television franchise is awarded to "the highest bidder offering 'the
highest percentage of gross annual receipts' derived from the franchise and.. . 'such other compensation or
consideration"' as the city council prescribes (quoting LA. Ordinance 58,200, sec. 5.2, at 91927)); see also Thomas
W. Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition in Cable Television: Implicationsfor Public Policy, 7 YALE J. ON REa. 65,
83 (1990) (explaining that "[t]he most common municipal practice is to auction just one cable franchise to the
applicant promising the highest level of subsidies for uneconomic services and programming, or to the applicant
with the most compelling political mix of equity owners"). Although California Government Code § 53066(b)
implicitly forbids cash auction bids from being considered in a city's decision to award a cable television franchise,
that section also encourages the consideration of the city's potential income from the award of the franchise
generally. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53066(b) (West Supp. 1997). California Government Code § 53066(b) also
encourages cities and counties to examine "any other consideration that will safeguard the local public interest."
Id.
34. David J. Saylor, Municipal Ripoff. 77te Unconstitutionality of Cable Television Franchise Fees and
Access Support Payments, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 671,672 (1986).
35. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 542(b) (West 1989) (allowing local governments to charge cable franchise fees of
up to five percent); C i. GOV'TCODE § 53066(c) (West Supp. 1997) (setting five percent of gross revenues as the
maximum franchise fee municipalities may charge cable television operators).
36. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (observing that telephone companies do not have to pay for
the use of the public right of way); supra note 35 and accompanying text (establishing municipal power to charge
cable providers up to five percent of gross revenues).
37. CAL. PUB. UTM. CODE § 7901.1 (West Supp. 1997); see id. (clarifying that municipalities may exercise
control over the time, place, and manner in which roads, highways, and waterways are accessed).
38. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1896, at 1 (June 27, 1996).
39. CAL- GOV'T CODE § 66001(b) (West Supp. 1997).
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a specified purpose, and not merely to raise general revenues. Once the relationship
between the amount of the fee and the cost of providing the facility has been shown
and the fee has been collected, the municipality may spend the funds only on the
facility for which the fee was chargede Other California statutes require that fees
charged by local governments not exceed the reasonable cost of providing the service
for which the fee is charged.4' Further, fees that would exceed the reasonable cost of
providing the service for which the fee is charged may only be assessed if such fees
are approved by two-thirds of the voters of the district.42
This means, in application, that before a municipality may charge a telecom-
munications company a fee for repairing a road damaged by the company's project
to lay cable in city streets, the municipality must first show that the amount of the
proposed fee bears a reasonable relationship to the cost of repairing the street. If the
amount of the fee would exceed the cost of repairing the street, the voters of that
district would have to approve the imposition of the fee before the municipality could
proceed.43 Once the fees are collected, municipalities must account for the funds by
showing that they are spent only for repairing the streets damaged by the particular
telecommunications providers.4
III. CHAPTER 300 AND ITS EFFECT ON CURRENT DISPUTES
Chapter 300 does not change existing law. 45 Chapter 300 requires that when local
governments impose a permit fee for the placement of telecommunications facilities,
such as lines, poles, and antennas, that fee cannot exceed the reasonable costs of pro-
viding the service for which the fee is charged and cannot be levied for general
revenue purposes.6 Accordingly, if the fee is designed to cover the administrative
costs of issuing permits, the amount of the fee cannot exceed the estimated cost of
providing that service. By forbidding permit fees from being levied for general
revenue purposes, Chapter 300 requires that each fee bear a reasonable relationship
to the cost of providing some other appropriate municipal service. 7 In addition to
40. Id. § 66006(a) (West Supp. 1997).
41. See, e.g., id. § 65104 (West Supp. 1997) (referring to fees charged by planning agencies); id. § 66014(a)
(West Supp. 1997) (referring to agency zoning and permit fees).
42. See CAL. CONsT. art. XII1 A, § 4 (explaining that the imposition of "special taxes" requires two-thirds
vote); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50076 (West 1983) (defining "special tax" as fees that exceed the reasonable
cost of providing the service for which the fee is charged, which are levied for general revenue purposes); id. §
50077(a) (West 1983) (requiring that special taxes be approved by two-thirds of voters of the district).
43. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting the requirement that fees charged not exceed costs
incurred).
44. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on municipal use of funds raised by
charging fees).
45. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 300. sec. 2(b), at 1891 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50030).
46. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50030 (enacted by Chapter 300).
47. See supra note 42 (explaining that fees that do not bear a reasonable relationship to providing the service
for which the fee is charged are "special taxes" under the California Constitution and require the approval of two-
thirds of the voters of the district).
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declaring that Chapter 300 does not constitute a change in existing law, Chapter 300
includes legislative findings that describe the state's interest in encouraging invest-
ment in the development and deployment of new telecommunications technologies.
48
Unfortunately, Chapter 300 does little to further these state interests. In essence,
Chapter 300 does nothing but clarify that existing law applies to the relationship
between municipalities and telecommunications providers, just as it applies to the
relationship between zoning agencies and developers.!9 Thus, when California
Government Code § 66001 refers to a "development project," it includes telecom-
munications projects to lay cables. When California Government Code § 65104
mentions "fees to support the work of the planning agency," it includes fees charged
to telecommunications companies for the issuing of permits.3 ' Unfortunately, since
existing law already protects telecommunications providers from unlawful charges,
the clarification that embodies Chapter 300 does nothing to encourage development
of, or investment in, new telecommunications technologies, and it does nothing to
eliminate municipal impediments to the deployment of advanced services.
What does Chapter 300 mean in the dispute between municipalities and telecom-
munications providers over the long-term impact of street cuts on the useful life of
city roads? Essentially, it means nothing. Before Chapter 300, it would have violated
state law for a municipality to impose a fee for general revenue purposes that ex-
ceeded the cost of providing the service for which the fee is charged 2 The same is
true after Chapter 300. Before Chapter 300, the outcome of disputes over street
impact fees would have turned on answers to these questions: Do properly repaired
street cuts really diminish the lifespan of roads? If so, is there a reasonable relation-
ship between the amount of the impact fee and the loss of street life attributable to
a particular company's street cutting activities? If the answer to these questions is
yes, the impact fees would likely survive, and telecommunications firms would have
to pay. Chapter 300 will not change this process or its result.
Neither will Chapter 300 protect telecommunications providers from munici-
palities that delay or deny construction permits in an effort to exact franchise fees.
Although the first two versions of the bill would have prohibited permit procedures
48. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 300, sec. 2(a), at 1890 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50030); see id. (finding,
for example, that "emerging technologies," such as the information superhighway, "will encourage economic
growth and provide social benefits to all Californians"); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting
Chapter 30)'s declaration that it does not constitute a change in existing law).
49. PAciFIC TE.EIS, supra note 13; see id (conceding that Chapter 300 merely makes explicit the fact that
existing law also applies to the issuance of permits to telecommunications companies).
50. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66001 (West Supp. 1997) (discussing fees imposed as a condition of approval
of a development project).
51. See id § 65104 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring that any fees charged to support the functions of planning
agencies "not exceed the reasonable cost of providing the service for which the fee is charged").
52. ASSEMBLY COiwMMIIEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, CoMmITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1896, at 2 (June 19,
1996); see idU (noting the opposition's view that, even before Chapter 300. it would have been unconstitutional for
a local agency to charge a permit fee that exceeded the cost of providing the service).
954
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that unduly delayed construction, or imposed unreasonable burdens upon tele-
communications providers, Chapter 300 provides neither of these benefits. 53
IV. THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: IGNORING THE PROBLEM OF FRANCHISE FEES
Although in its present form Chapter 300 does nothing to forbid municipalities
from attempting to impose franchise agreements, the original version of the bill
contained language that would have alleviated this problem. The bill as introduced
by Senator Costa would have prevented municipalities from charging telecommuni-
cations companies any fee that exceeded the amount required to issue permits. '
Initial opponents of the bill, such as the California State Association of Counties and
the League of California Cities, recognized that this provision would have prevented
local governments from charging telecommunications companies rent for their use
of city streets. 55 Thus, to the extent that cable operators and telephone companies use
the streets to sell telecommunications services, each would have benefitted from free
access to the public right of way. Accordingly, had the language of the original bill
been retained, Chapter 300 would have prevented municipalities from imposing
franchise agreements upon telecommunications providers, thus removing a hindrance
to the deployment of advanced services.
The future of the relationship between local officials and the telecommunications
industry depends so significantly upon the future of municipal franchise fees that the
Senate Committee on Housing and Land Use likened the absence of this issue in later
versions of the bill to "the elephant in the room that no one wants to mention. 56 By
failing to address the issue of franchise fees, the legislature has simply ignored a
crucial issue that will not go away. Although cities and counties claim that they have
a fiduciary duty to collect rent for telecommunications companies' use of the public
right of way, taxing the industry in this way is likely to result in other significant
harms. Despite the legislature's failure to eliminate municipal franchise fees under
Chapter 300, franchise fees for the use of the public right of way remain ripe for
extinction.
53. Compare SB 1896 § 2(b) (original version, Feb. 22, 1996) (prohibiting permit procedures that unduly
delay or impose unreasonable burdens on the placement of telecommunications facilities) and SB 1896 § 3(b)
(amended version, Apr. 8, 1996) (preventing delays or unreasonable burdens) with 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 300,
sec. 3, at 1891 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50030). This language was removed from all other versions of the
bill, including Chapter 300.
54. See SB 1896 § 3(a) (original version, Feb. 22, 1996) (requiring that fees not exceed the amount
necessary to issue permits).
55. Letter from Baker & Jones, supra note 11 (conceding that the first version of the bill would have
mandated free access to selective users of the public right of way).
56. SENATE HOUSING AND LAND USE COMMrrTEE, CoMMrrTEE ANALYSIS oF SB 1896, at 2 (May 6, 1996).
57. See Letter from Baker & Jones, supra note I 1 (noting that cities and counties claim a fiduciary duty to
collect rent for use of the public right of way).
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A. Cable Franchise Fees Are Unconstitutional in California
1. Freedom of Speech
A number of constitutional objections have been raised regarding the municipal
imposition of cable television franchise fees.58 The most significant of these depends
upon the United States Supreme Court's recognition that because cable television
operators exercise a measure of editorial control over the content of their trans-
missions, like newspapers and broadcast television stations, they are entitled to First
Amendment protection.59 As telephone companies begin offering television services,
they will presumably benefit from this same status.
Since cable operators qualify as First Amendment speakers, the Constitution
limits the power of government to tax, and therefore "abridge," their speech. 60 As the
Court explained in Leathers v. Medlock,61 "[tihe press plays a unique role as a check
on government abuse, and a tax limited to the press raises concerns about censorship
of critical information and opinion. 62 Thus, laws that single out particular members
of the press for special treatment are always entitled to heightened First Amendment
scrutiny. 63 However, strict scrutiny, which respects only those laws that are narrowly
drawn to serve a compelling state interest, is reserved for regulations that somehow
reflect government's preference for the content of protected speech.64 In determining
whether a statute is content-based, the Court has explained that the primary question
is whether the legislature has adopted the restriction on speech because of agreement
or disagreement with the particular communication.6 Under this analysis, laws that
are content-neutral, and do not impact speech based upon the messages or ideas ex-
pressed, do not merit the careful examination of strict scrutiny.6Rather, because they
are less likely to limit the expression of particular ideas or views, laws that restrict
speech without regard to content deserve an intermediate level of constitutional
scrutiny.67
58. See infra notes 59-96 (discussing several constitutional arguments against cable television franchise
fees).
59. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. F.C.C., 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994) (declaring that cable
operators engage in and transmit speech, and are thus entitled to the protection of the First Amendment).
60. See id, (reporting the Supreme Court's declaration that cable operators are First Amendment speakers);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (forbidding Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of speech").
61. 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
62. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 447.
63. Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2458.
64. Id. at 2458-59; see id. (explaining which circumstances are appropriate for the application of strict
scrutiny).
65. Id. at 2459; see id. (discussing the process for determining whether or not a particular regulation is
content-based).
66. See id. (determining that laws that are unrelated to the content of speech deserve an intermediate level
of scrutiny).
67. Id.
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Although municipalities claim cable television franchise fees as rent for the cable
provider's use of a valuable property interest-the public right of way-the fees re-
main a burden on speech that the traditional press, which does not lay cables in pub-
lic streets, does not bear.68 Consequently, since cable television franchise fees single
out only one part of the press for special treatment, they are constitutionally suspect,
and merit some form of heightened scrutiny.69 Nevertheless, since local officials are
merely demanding compensation for the use of public property, the existence of such
fees probably does not suggest the municipality's agreement or disagreement with
any particular television message. Accordingly, since cable franchise fees do not
impact speech based upon its content, they are unlikely to demand strict scrutiny.
However, since the fees make it more difficult for cable operators to "speak" in com-
munities where the fees are imposed, the fees jeopardize cable operators' ability to
express their particular views. Thus, intermediate scrutiny is appropriate. 0
Content-neutral speech regulations must meet a three-part test for intermediate
scrutiny analysis. In order to pass intermediate scrutiny, a statute must: (1) Serve a
significant governmental interest, (2) be "narrowly tailored" to serve that interest,
and (3) allow ample alternative channels for communication of the information!'
Cable franchise fees, as they are imposed in California, cannot pass this test.
The first prong of intermediate scrutiny analysis requires that the law in question
serve a significant government interest.72 For municipalities, the interest in cable tele-
vision franchise fees is an interest in raising revenue by exacting compensation for
68. See Letter from Baker & Jones, supra note 11 (claiming that cities and counties, as managers of public
property, have a fiduciary duty to collect rent for the use of those assets).
69. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (explaining that because of the governmental interest in
assuring free access to information, heightened scrutiny is always appropriate where a tax singles out one member
of the press). Since cable operators are the only members of the press that depend upon the use of the public right
of way, charges for that use fall exclusively upon cable operators. See infra notes 89-90 (noting that cable television
requires the use of public streets, and thus has no alternative forum in which to communicate).
70. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that laws that are content-neutral do not require strict
scrutiny).
71. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see Turner Broadcasting
Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2459 (suggesting that the Clark test applies an intermediate level of scrutiny); Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 198 (4th Cir. 1994) (assuming that when a regulation of speech
is content-neutral, Clark's second prong---the requirement that the restrictions be "narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest"--should be expanded to examine both whether the regulation is narrowly tailored
and whether the governmental interest is significant); cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)
(establishing a similar four-part test requiring that government regulations that involve both speech and nonspeech
elements be within the constitutional power of government, further a substantial governmental interest, be unrelated
to the suppression.of free expression, and restrict no more speech than is essential to the furtherance of the
governmental interest). The Federal District Court for the Northern District of California found the three-part time,
place, and manner test of Clark, and the four-part O'Brien test to be similar, each leading to the same conclusion.
See Century Fed. v. City of Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp. 1559, 1569 (N.D. Cal. 1988); see also id. at 1578 (overturning
a Palo Alto cable television franchising program because of unjustified infringements upon the free speech of cable
operators).
72. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (outlining a three-part test for First Amendment intermediate
scrutiny analysis).
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the use of the public right of way.73 Courts have explained that because of the nature
of government, an interest in raising revenue is always significant, if not critical. 4
However, that interest alone will not justify a law that impacts free speech where
revenue can be raised without implicating First Amendment concerns. 5
The second prong of intermediate scrutiny analysis demands that the law in ques-
tion be narrowly tailored to serve the governmental interest.76 The Supreme Court ex-
plained that a law is narrowly tailored as long as "the means chosen [for addressing
the governmental interest] do not 'burden substantially more speech than is necessary
to further the government's legitimate interests."'"7 It is with this element of inter-
mediate scrutiny that cable television franchise fees fail.
In order to satisfy the second prong of intermediate scrutiny, a franchise fee that
is narrowly tailored to raise revenue should not impact any more speech than is
necessary for that purpose.78 Accordingly, if a municipality has an interest in re-
covering rent for the use of the public right of way, the Constitution demands that
such rent be exacted from all users of public roads, without regard to a particular
user's status as a member of the press. 79 Thus telephone companies, electric utilities,
and cable television providers, which make equivalent use of the public right of way,
should be charged equal amounts of rent for that use. Yet this is not the case in
California.
In California, state law places discriminatory limits upon the fees that can be
charged users of the public right of way. For example, while California Government
Code § 53066 allows cities and counties to charge cable operators a fee of up to five
percent of gross receipts, the state franchise granted by California Public Utilities
Code § 7901 prevents municipalities from charging telephone companies anything
for their use of public streets." Likewise, in contrast to the five percent charge levied
against cable operators, California Public Utilities Code § 6231 prevents munici-
palities from charging electric franchisors more than two percent of gross annual
73. Letter from Baker & Jones. supra note 11 (claiming that the cities have a responsibility to secure rent
for the use of the public right of way).
74. See, eg., Minneapolis Star& Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S, 575, 586 (1983)
(claiming that the interest in raising revenue is critical to any government); see also Century Fed., 710 F. Supp. at
1577 (asserting that a municipality's interest in raising revenue is a significant, if not compelling, interest).
75. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 586 (determining that an interest in revenue, alone,
cannot justify special treatment of the press when a method of raising revenue that does not implicate First
Amendment concerns is available).
76. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing a three-part test for First Amendment intermediate
scrutiny analysis).
77. Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 409 U.S. 781,
799 (1989)).
78. Id.
79. See Century Fed., 710 F. Supp. at 1578 (holding that a municipality may not charge fees for the use of
the public right of way in a manner that discriminates against First Amendment speakers).
80. See supra notes 29,35 and accompanying text (discussing California's disparate treatment of telephone
companies and cable operators); supra notes 21-31 (discussing the various protections that emanate from California
Public Utilities Code § 7901).
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receipts.8 1 Faced with this same disparity, which places greater burdens upon pro-
tected cable operators than upon identical users of the same roads, the District Court
for the Northern District of California concluded that "while under some circum-
stances the [c]ities presumably could charge a nondiscriminatory rent for the use of
their rights of way ... they may not, as here, do so in a way that impermissibly dis-
criminates against speakers exercising protected First Amendment rights." Further,
the court explained, the prohibition of § 7901 provides no excuse: Since the
important question is whether equivalent users of public streets are charged per-
missibly under the First Amendment, the mere fat that § 7901 forbids municipalities
from imposing equal charges upon telephone companies does not justify uncon-
stitutional discrimination against cable operators. 3
Unfortunately, state law may also make impossible even a nondiscriminatory
rent for the use of public rights of way. Although the privileges granted by California
Public Utilities Code § 7901 must be exercised in accordance with the strictures
imposed by the Public Utilities Commission, the California Supreme Court explained
that when telephone companies accept the offer of a state franchise tendered by §
7901, that acceptance gives telephone companies vested rights that cannot be
impaired by subsequent acts of the legislature, or even by the people through a con-
stitutional provision.84 Thus, it may be impossible for municipalities to ever charge
telephone companies for their use of public roads, even if the state legislature, or the
people, should change the law. These rulings may ensure that the only nondis-
criminatory rent that could be charged all users of the public right of way is no rent
at all.
Cable television and traditional telephone services both require cables to be laid
in public streets.as By forbidding municipalities from charging telephone companies
equal rent for their use of the public right of way, state law places a disproportionate
burden upon cable operators. Thus, state law requires municipalities that charge fran-
chise fees to "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the
government's legitimate interests" in raising revenue.8 Consequently, in California,
cable television franchise fees are probably not narrowly tailored to serve the govern-
81. CAL. PUB. UTM. CODE § 6231 (West 1994).
82. Century Fed., 710 F. Supp. at 1578.
83. See id. at 1575-76 & n.36 (discussing the requirement that equivalent users of the public right of
way-such as telephone companies and cable operators-be charged comparable amounts for that use, regardless
of the way the state legislature may divide regulatory responsibility between state and municipal governments).
84. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting that various decisions of the California Supreme Court
prohibit rights obtained under California Public Utilities Code § 7901 from being legislatively impaired); see also
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 44 Cal. 2d 272, 276, 282 P.2d 36, 39 (1955) (explaining that
privileges must be exercised in accordance with the authority vested in the Public Utilities Commission).
85. See infra note 89 and accompanying text (noting the requirement that cable television and traditional
telephone service use cables laid in and along public roads).
86. Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 409 U.S. 781,799 (1989)).
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mental interest, and are thus unlikely to satisfy the second prong of intermediate
scrutiny.
The third prong of intermediate scrutiny requires that the law in question leave
open ample alternative channels for the communication of the information.8 7 Cable
franchise fees cannot survive this requirement. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit explained that "for a regulation to be constitutional, the ample alternative
methods of communication must be sufficiently similar to the method foreclosed by
the regulation."8 8 Yet for cable television operators, this requirement is much more
restrictive. Cable television, like traditional telephone service, depends upon the use
of cables, which must be laid in and along public streets.89 As the court in Century
Federal recognized, "there is... no alternative forum for cable television operators
to communicate."' 9 Accordingly, when local governments impose franchise fees for
the use of the public right of way, they tend to foreclose access to the only channel
through which cable operators can communicate. Thus, cable franchise fees do not
leave open even one alternative channel for the "speech" of cable operators, and con-
sequently they fail to satisfy the third prong of intermediate scrutiny.
In California, cable television franchise fees cannot be narrowly tailored to serve
the governmental interest in raising revenue and they do not leave open any alter-
native fora for the communication of cable operators' speech. Thus, these franchise
fees fail to pass the second and third prongs of intermediate First Amendment
scrutiny, and are therefore unconstitutional infringements of free speech.
2. Freedom to Listen
Although First Amendment free speech analysis frequently focuses upon free-
dom of expression, also significant is its logical counterpart: freedom to listen. As
the Supreme Court explained in Turner Broadcasting, "assuring that the public has
access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the
highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment."9' It is access
to a wide variety of information sources that enables Americans to develop informed
opinions and cast conscientious, meaningful votes; diverse sources of knowledge
give people the tools for deciding which ideas deserve respect and expression, and
which notions should be rejected.92 Because they tend to eliminate an important
87. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (presenting three-part intermediate scrutiny test).
88. Chesapeake & Potomac TeL Co., 42 F.3d at 203.
89. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766,773, 336 P.2d 514, 518 (1959)
(explaining that a traditional telephone circuit cannot be created without laying cables either along or acros3 the
streets); see also Century FedL, 710 F. Supp. at 1577 (indicating that both parties to this dispute conceded that cable
television requires the use of the public right of way).
90. Century Fed., 710 F. Supp. at 1577.
91. TurnerBroadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2470.
92. Id. at 2458.
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source of information, cable franchise fees are inimical to this First Amendment
ideal.
Since it is less likely to filter news through journalistic bias, some commentators
find cable television to be a more valuable source of information than radio, news-
papers, or traditional broadcast television. 3 As one observer noted, whereas broad-
cast television programs typically present news in rigid formats, and from prejudicial
perspectives, many cable networks, such as C-SPAN, allow viewers unfiltered access
to news as it happens. 94 Also, because of the greater number of available channels,
cable television allows information to be presented from many more perspectives
than can be provided by the four or five traditional broadcast networks. 95 The multi-
plicity of viewpoints that cable television allows permits Americans to develop more
informed, more independent opinions. Thus, when municipalities impose franchise
fees upon cable television operators, they begin to foreclose access to these raw and
diverse views, and they damage the free exchange of ideas that is so important to the
First Amendment.
96
B. Cable Franchise Fees Are Incompatible with State Policy
In addition to being unconstitutional, the municipal imposition of cable franchise
fees is incompatible with California telecommunications policy. The California
Legislature claims a commitment to promoting competition in telecommunications
markets and encouraging the widespread availability of high-quality, state-of-the-art
telecommunications services?7 By declining to eliminate cable franchise fees via
Chapter 300, the legislature has undermined the achievement of those goals. Cable
franchise fees also frustrate efforts to ensure lower prices for consumers.
Although municipalities claim that a fiduciary duty to the public requires them
to charge cable franchise fees, such charges harm consumers more than they help.98
As one company explained, "but for the payment of franchise fees, [we] would have
available additional funds 'to purchase more or better programming, to improve
responsiveness to consumer needs and interests, and to finance communication with
93. Note, Taxation of Cable Television, 109 HARV. L. REV. 440,447 (1995).
94. Id. at 447-48.
95. Id. at 448.
96. See Kent D. Wakeford, Note, Municipal Cable Franchising: Unwarranted Intrusion into Competitive
Markets, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 233, 282 (1995) (explaining that the fees charged to cable companies by municipal
governments cause a shift in the subscription rate or the package of services such that increased costs are born by
consumers).
97. CAL PUB. UTIL. CODE § 709(a), (b) (West Supp. 1997); see id. (declaring California telecommunications
policy).
98. See Letter from Baker & Jones, supra note 11 (claiming that cities and counties, as property managers
of public assets, have a fiduciary duty to charge rent for the use of those assets). See generally Wakeford, supra
note 96 (detailing the adverse consequences of municipal cable television franchising).
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more subscribers through lower pricing." '99 Likewise, additional funds would allow
cable operators to accelerate the replacement of aging equipment with newer sys-
tems, capable of providing unprecedented access to such services as interactive
television, high-speed Internet access, telecommuting, and videoconferencing. 100
Yet municipal demands for expensive franchise agreements are forcing telecom-
munications companies that use the public right of way to abandon efforts to install
cable networks capable of providing advanced services. For example, a Pacific
Telesis project to install interactive television in Los Angeles was derailed by failed
negotiations with the city over franchise fees for the new service.'01
The municipal imposition of franchise fees, such as this failed attempt in Los
Angeles, has the effect of driving an increasing number of telecommunications
providers toward wireless technologies that do not require the costly use of the public
right of way, and thus do not require the grant of a municipal franchise.1'2 For
example, Tele-TV, a joint venture of three former Bell companies, Pacific Telesis,
Bell Atlantic, and Nynex, has scrapped its plan to install a broadband "video dial-
tone" network, in favor of "wireless cable" technology that uses microwave trans-
mission and does not depend upon the use of public streets. 0 3 Although it is
expensive to install a city-wide cable plant, the cost can become prohibitive when
cities and counties also demand greater than five percent of gross revenues for the
mere use of the city streets.1°4 Accordingly, companies whose technologies do not
depend upon the use of public roads have a competitive advantage over those that do.
Thus, while the legislature may intend to foster the creation of competitive markets,
by neglecting to destroy municipal cable franchise fees, they are in fact making
competition very difficult for telecommunications firms that use public streets.
Unfortunately, as the anticompetitive environment created by municipal fran-
chising drives telecommunications providers toward wireless solutions, it also pushes
99. Erie Telecomm. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, 594 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (quoting plaintiff's brief in
support of motion for summary judgment).
100. See Wakeford, supra note 96, at 283-84 (explaining that regulatory fees deter investment in new fixed
assets).
101. See Amy Harmon, supra note 11, at I (reporting that Los Angeles officials admitted that, along with
aesthetic concerns, negotiations over franchise fees inspired the City's refusal to issue more than 100 construction
permits necessary for Pacific Bell's project to install an interactive television system).
102. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (listing one example of a pressured move to wireless
technologies).
103. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 1 (blaming the change in technology on the difficulty of getting permits
from the city because of the dispute over franchise fees); see also Leslie Cauley, Business Brief. Baby Bells Push
the Pause Button Again on Tele-TV Interactive Unit, WALL ST. J. (New York, N.Y.), June 7, 1996, at B4
(explaining that all three baby bells have pulled back from their original plan in order to focus on far cheaper
"wireless cable" technology).
104. See Saylor supra note 34, at 672 & n.6 (explaining that with public access channels, access support
payments, and free wiring of city buildings, the actual cost to the cable company can exceed the five percent cap
placed upon franchise fees by federal law); see also Wakeford, supra note 96, at 282 (explaining that municipal
governments impose fees that would not be required in efficient markets, such that large expenditures must be
added to the already substantial costs of providing cable television service).
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them, and consumers, away from the most promising technologies. For example,
while wireless solutions, such as digital "wireless cable" and digital broadcast
satellite (DBS), allow the transmission of from 120 to 200 different television chan-
nels into subscribers' homes, the television cable that already passes ninety-five per-
cent of American homes is capable of transmitting as many as 5000 television chan-
nels."03 This enormous capacity would make possible such advanced services as two-
way videoconferencing and Internet access at speeds that "wireless cable" and DBS
cannot deliver.0 6 Thus, as municipal franchising drives competitors away from cable
solutions, it limits development of the most promising services and hurts consumers
by preventing them from having access to state-of-the-art services.
Franchise fees also defeat legislative efforts to ensure lower prices for con-
sumers.'07 Cable operators are capable of paying franchise fees only because they
shift these costs to consumers, by either raising subscription rates, or by cutting costs
through eliminating services.18 In either case, consumers lose; they must either pay
more for cable television or they must pay the same and get less for their money.
Thus, franchise fees operate to transfer wealth from consumers into government
budgets. Are the people really demanding this kind of taxation from their public
fiduciaries? One commentator urges the abandonment of this inefficient use of
resources:
By allowing a competitive environment to evolve and eliminating municipal
franchising, the waste transfers may not end, but they will shift to another
set of demands, those of the consumers. The consumers, rather than
politicians or local governments, will be the recipients of campaigns to win
them over, therefore maximizing society's total wealth.'09
105. Wireless Test Successful, TELEVrsIoN DIGEST, July 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7064963 (copy on
file with the Pacific Law Journal); see id. (explaining that digital compression would allow wireless cable systems
to transmit up to 200 channels); see also Hiawatha Bray, Battle of the Bandwidth Profits Fuel Race to Find Fastest
Way, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 11, 1996, at B6 (reporting that coaxial television cables now pass ninety-five percent
of American homes, though only sixty-five percent actually subscribe); George Gilder, Mike Milken and the Two
Trillion Dollar Opportunity, FORBES, Apr. 10, 1996, at S104 (reporting that a one-gigahertz cable television cable
can carry eight billion bits of two-way data per second, or 5000 digital television channels); Marc Gunther, The
Man the Phone Companies Forgot, FORTUNE, May 27, 1996, at 106 (estimating that digital wireless television can
carry 120 channels of video service); Sara Humphry, What Channel Is My E-Mail on?, PC WEEK, July 15, 1996,
at N26 (explaining that digital wireless systems will be capable of delivering 125 channels of video service).
106. See Kerry Fehr-Snyder, Surfing the Net by Satellite Dish, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 8, 1996, at Al
(reporting that DirecPC, a DBS-based Internet access service from GM Hughes Electronics, is capable of sending
data at only 400,000 digital bits per second, compared with the 10 million bits per second that can be sent over
existing coaxial cable television modems).
107. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 709(e) (West Supp. 1997) (stating that the encouragement of lower prices
is one of California's policies for telecommunications).
108. Wakeford, supra note 96, at 282; see id. (explaining how consumers end up bearing the costs of
franchise fees).
109. Id. at 283 (citations omitted).
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By failing to forbid municipal franchise fees, the legislature neglected a significant
means of lowering consumer prices.
C. The Same Reasons that Supported the Creation of a State Telephone Fran-
chise Support the Elimination of Cable Franchise Fees
The same policies that supported state control over telephone service suggest that
state or federal government should take regulatory control over advanced telecom-
munications.
Like e-mail and videoconferencing, at one time, even basic telephone service was
not essential; yet it became so through widespread use. ° In 1959, the California
Supreme Court reported that, in the previous fifty years, as competing telephone
companies began interconnecting and subscribers of one telephone company gained
the ability to communicate with subscribers of other companies, the number of tele-
phones in California had grown from 195,000 to 6 million.' As Californians gained
the ability to communicate with each other, telephone service became so essential
that, by 1959, it became a matter of statewide concern." 2 The state legislature pre-
empted local control over telephone service to ensure that all Californians, not just
those in forward-thinking communities, were able to benefit from telephone
service."
3
A similar transformation is occurring today with advanced telecommunications
services. Communication via e-mail is increasingly replacing communication by tele-
phone.1 4 Americans now send more e-mail than regular paper mail.' Almost eighty
percent of American companies and organizations use e-mail, and more than 100
million Internet e-mail messages are exchanged each day. 116 The Rand Corporation
sees such benefits in e-mail that it is recommending that every American be given
a personalized e-mail address. 17 If e-mail is not yet as essential as the telephone, it
is only a matter of time before it will become so.
110. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of telephone servica in
California, and the resulting statewide concern that all Californians benefit from this essential technology).
111. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766,775,336 P.2d 514,520 (1959).
112. IL at 776, 336 P.2d at 520.
113. Id. at 774-75, 336 P.2d at 519; see id. (explaining that the offer of a state franchise "was made for the
purpose of providing the people of the state with statewide communication services").
114. See Wayne Rash, Writing Is Back if It's E-MaiL then It's a Letter, Sort of, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ.),
Nov. 22, 1995, available in 1995 WL 11800014 (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (explaining that people
choose to write e-mail when previously they would have used the telephone).
115. Tim Jackson, Snail Mail Swan Song, FiN. TOM, Oct. 28, 1996, at 15; see id. (reporting that in 1995
Americans sent more e-mail than U.S. mail).
116. See E-Mail Common in Workplace, but Usage Policies Lacking, NEWsYT, Feb. 12, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 7907264 (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (reporting that almost 80% of American
companies and organizations use e-mail); O'Reilly Publishes Guide to Internet Firewalls, M2 PRESSWJRE, Scpt.
21, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10484339 (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (reporting that more than
100 million Internet messages are exchanged each day).
117. Michelle Slatalla, Community Revolution Builds Online, L.A. Tims, May 27, 1996, at DI.
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 28
As the main source of news for most Americans, television also has become an
indispensable tool for daily living."' Though television makes an invaluable con-
tribution to the "marketplace of ideas," the dispersement of practical knowledge may
be television's most significant function. 9 What happens when I dial 911? What
should I do if my wallet is stolen? What is the best way to stay safe in an earthquake?
The answers to questions like these are likely to have a significant impact upon the
quality of life for many Californians.
If, through the imposition of franchise fees, municipalities are permitted to
impede the deployment of advanced telecommunications services-as they have
done in many California cities-Californians may be denied access to advanced
services, such as e-mail and interactive television, that doubtlessly would improve
the quality of life, but may also mean the difference between life and death. Just as
telephone service was once a novelty and became essential, television, e-mail, and
many other advanced services are becoming more and more vital.12As an increasing
number of Californians begin to rely upon these advanced services for their daily
communications needs, the legislature must ensure that municipalities do not use the
threat of franchise fees to short-circuit the deployment of these technologies. Just as
the deployment of telephone service required the grant of a state franchise in 1905,
advanced telecommunications services need the same advantage now.
V. CONCLUSION
Advanced telecommunications services, and the benefits that they will bring to
California consumers, depend upon the use of public roads by telecommunications
providers. When, by delaying or denying the issuance of permits, municipalities pre-
vent telecommunications companies from gaining access to this public right of way,
they frustrate the development of a state telecommunications infrastructure capable
of establishing California "on the leading edge of the telecommunications
revolution.'' Consequently, Californians are prevented from gaining the social and
economic benefits that would accompany such development. Accordingly, municipal
franchise fees impede the realization of state telecommunications goals.
Through Chapter 300, the California Legislature had the opportunity to eliminate
municipal impediments to the deployment of advanced telecommunications services
by preventing unnecessary delays in the issuance of permits, and by eliminating
118. David Shaw, Papers Get Respondents' Nodfor Job Well Done, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1995, at 9
(reporting that more people get their news from television than from newspapers).
119. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing television's role in the marketplace of ideas).
120. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (explaining how telephone service became essential
through widespread use); supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text (discussing society's increasing dependence
upon e-mail and television).
121. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 300, sec. 2(a)(1), at 1891 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50030); see id.
(expressing the legislature's intent to establish California as a telecommunications leader).
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franchise fees. 2 Chapter 300 fails to solve either problem. Since it merely maintains
the status quo, Chapter 300 succeeds only in preserving a strained relationship bet-
ween municipalities and telecommunications providers. As telecommunications
providers seek to deploy advanced services throughout California, Chapter 300 pro-
vides no assurances that progress will not be disrupted by local governments seeking
to impose franchise agreements in order to improve municipal bank accounts.
Allowing municipalities to impede progress this way is not in the public's best
interests.
Franchise fees should be eliminated because they are unconstitutional, they hurt
the interests of both companies and consumers, and they make important statewide
communication more difficult. Unfortunately, if California continues on this course,
the state will lose, telecommunications companies will lose, and consumers will lose.
APPENDIX
Code Section Affected
Government Code § 50030 (new).
SB 1896 (Costa); 1996 STAT. Ch. 300
122. See supra note 53 (noting that the first two versions of SB 1896, which became Chapter 300, would have
prohibited permit procedures that unduly delayed construction or imposed unreasonable burdens upon
telecommunications providers); supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (explaining that the first version of SB
1896, the bill that became Chapter 300, would have eliminated municipal cable franchise fees by prohibiting local
governments from charging telecommunications companies rent for their use of the public right of way).
